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Abstract
Multiattribute decision analysis is a methodology for
providing information to a decision maker for comparing and selecting
between complex alternatives. This Report presents a brief introduc-
tion to the principal concepts of the Keeney and Raiffa approach to
multiattribute decision analysis. The Report presents the concepts
of decision alternatives, outcomes, objectives, attributes and their
states, attribute utility functions, and the necessary independence
properties for the attribute states to be aggregated into a numerical
representation of the preferences of the decision maker for the
outcomes and the decision alternatives.
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FOREWORD
This Report . has been prepared in response to the many requests for
an introductory level explanation of the multiattribute decision analysis
methods used in the evaluation of technology alternatives for Small Power
Systems Applications (SPSA). It is intended to focus on the methodology
rather than on the context of the illustrative examples. Hence, simple
examples are employed here. These simple examples are not drawn from
Small Power Systems Applications due to the rapidly evolving and changing
criteria and attribute scales to be used in that context. It is believed
that the use of examples likely to stimulate extensive discussion would
distract the reader from the introductory level explanation.
This Report is intended to serve as an introduction to the Report on
the "Criteria and Methodology for Ranking Small Power Systems Applications
Technology Alternatives." Thus, this introduction is Volume I of a three-
volume effort. The second volume contains a detailed description of the
criteria, their attributes, and the decision analysis process developed to
evaluate and rank technology alternatives for small (1-10 MWe) solar
thermal power systems applications. The third, and final volume in this
series will cover the interviews and subsequent analysis for evaluating
and ranking the SPSA technology alternatives. Volume III is presently
scheduled for completion in May, 1979.
The immediate purpose of this document is to aid people in the
understanding and use of the second and third volumes at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, the Department of Energy and cooperating organiza-
tions such as Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories and the Solar Energy
Research Institute. An additional use of this introductory Report is to
explain multiattribute decision analysis to individuals facing other pro-
blems that may be amenable to this methodology.
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1.	 Introduction
Multiattribute decision analysis is a methodology for providing
information to a decision maker for comparing and selecting between com-
plex alternatives. The methodology of multiattribute decision analysis
is derived from the techniques of operations research, statistics, eco-
nomics, mathematics, and psychology. Thus,researchers from a wide range
of disciplines have participated in the development of multiattribute
decision analysis. The first books and papers on the subject appeared
in the late 1960's [1-4]. The most practical, extensive, and complete
presentation of an approach to multiattribute decision analysis is given
in the 1976 work of Keeney and Raiffa [5]. While several approaches to
multiattribute decision analysis have been developed [6-17], the princi-
pal method described in this Report corresponds to that of Keeney and
Raiffa [5].
1
ti
2.	 The Decision Analysis Paradigm
The paradigm for any decision analysis is depicted in Figure 1. A
problem or a requirement exists. A set of alternative actions, called
"alternatives," are available. The decision maker must select one, and
only one, alternative. Examples of alternatives might relate to a
corporate policy decision, a capital budgeting decision, selection of
a system design, or a personnel decisi;:;n. The selected alternative is
an input to a system model which is a set of descriptions or mathematical
equations relating the selected alternative to the resultant "outcome."
Uncertainty
System
	 Outcomes	
Value	
Preferences
Model	 Model
Figure 1. The Decision Analysis Paradigm
When no uncertainty exists in the system model, then the selection
of a specific alternative results in a prescribed outcome. For example,
the investment of $1,000 in a Federally insured savings account at
6% interest compounded annually will result in an outcome for certain of
$1,060 after one year. If uncertainty exists, then the selection of a
specific alternative could result in any one of several outcomes. Invest-
ing in the stock market would be a prime example. The alternative would
be the investment portfolio selected. The system model would include all
of the economic forces and uncertainties that act on the stock market.
The outcome would be the value of the investment portfolio at the time it
was sold plus any dividends that had accrued. This is an extreme example
2
rof a systeti model dominated by uncertainty, because no valid system model
of the actions of the stock market presently exists [18, 191.
The problems to which decision analysis can be most usefully applied
lie somewhere between these two extremes. For example, an advanced energy
system is to be developed. Certain engineering principles and experience
with prhtotype designs give a good indication of how the system will per-
form. However, some uncertainties will still exist such as the cost of
the energy system in mass production or the reliability in commercial
operation.
In the decision analysis paradigm, the outcomes of the system model
provide the input to the decision maker's value model. The output of the
value model states the decision maker's preferences, either in terms of
a rank ordering of the outcomes or a numerical scale that measures
strength of preference as well as rank ordering.
3
3.--- Thw Dacia-ion Maker-
Any decision analysis assumes that there is a single decision maker
or a group of people that can be expected to reach a consensus of opinion.
It is the preferences of this person, or of this group, that will be us4d
in the decision model. This requires that the decision analysts interact
with the decision maker or his representatives in formulating the value
model. Where consensus is required of a group of people, the consensus
must be obtained by means external to the decision analysis. There pre-
sently exists no analytical means of combining disparate preferences into
a single or "true" preference, nor may there ever be [5, 20-23]. There
exist axiomatic formulations for obtaining group preferences, based on
concepts of rationality, fairness, and efficiency, but they ultimately all
contain one or more logical assumptions that can be seriously questioned.
Even the selection of a group decision model is in itself a group decision.
An extensive discussion of a group decision analysis where the members of
the group had disparate preferences is that of Dyer and Miles [24-16].
4
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The multiattribute aspect of decision analysis appears because,
for most complicated problems or complex systems, the outcomes must be
evaluated in terms of several objectives (also called "goals" or "criteria").
Objectives of a decision analysis are stated in terms of properties, either
desirable or undesirable, that determine the decision maker's preferences
for the outcomes. For the design of an automobile, several objectives
might be: (1) to minimize cost, (2) to minimize fuel consumption, (3) to
minimize air pollution, and (4) to maximize safety. The purpose of the
value model is to take the outcomes of the system model, determine the degree
to which the outcomes satisfy each of the objectives, and then make the nec-
essary trade-offs between the objectives to arrive at a ranking for the out-
comes that correctly expresses the preferences of the decision maker.
The value model is developed in terms of a hierarchy of objectives and
sub-objectives, as shown in Figure 2 for the design of an automobile. In
order to quantify the value model, a unit of measurement must be assigned
to the lowest members of the objectives hierarchy. These measurement units
are called "attributes," and they are scaled in convenient units to measure
the degree to which the associated objective is satisfied. In Figure 2,
six attributes are used to quantify the value model, and the outcomes of
the associated system model would be expressed as a six-component vector,
with the components corresponding to the six attributes, i.e.,
x - (xl ,x29 x3 ,x49 x59 x6), where xi is the ith attribute of the value model.
A specific occurrence of an attribute is called a "state" of the attribute.
An "attribute state" for the objective "minimize fuel consumption" might
be x3 - 35 miles per gallon.
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5.	 Aggregating Objectives into a Value Model
Once attributes have been assigned to all the objectives and
attribute states have been determined for all the outcomes, it is then
necessary to aggregate the Attribute states of each outcome through trade-
offs into a single unit of measurement that will correctly represent the
preference ordering of the decision maker for the outcomes.
One common method for aggregating the attribute states is the
"willingness to pay" or "pricing out" technique [5]. One attribute is
singled out as the measurement attribute, preferably an attribute measured
in money. Then, one at a time, each of the other attributes are changed
to a reference state, with the money state of the measurement attribute
adjusted by means of an assessed trade-off or rate of substitution to com-
pensate for the change in the other attribute. Through this process, ai'.
the outcomes are expressed in terms of n attributes, n-1 of which all have
been -djusted to the same reference att.Libute state. The preference rark-
ing of the decision maker is then expressed by the state assigned to the
measurement attribute. Unfortunately, easy as this method is to apply, it
is valid with constant rates of substitution only when two conditions are
satisfied:
1. The trade-offs for the measurement attribute and any other
attribute are independent of the states of the other
n-2 attributes.
2. The trade-offs for the measurement attribute and any other
attribute do not depend on the states of either the measurement
attribute or the other attribute. (This literally is what
"constant rate of substitution" means.)
7
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For two-attribute outcomes, x - (xl-,x_7).-this requires that the trade-off
curves be straight lines (A trade-off curve is a line through a set of out-
-	 comes for which the decision maker is "indifferent" or "equally prefers.")
i
Thus, this "pricing out" technique is extremely difficult to apply to
objectives whose attributes exhibit a diminishing return to scale.
For outcomes represented by more than two attributes, similar arguments
apply.
	
s
Fof the Keeney and Raiffa formulation [5] that is to be described
in the remainder of this report, the attribute states are quantified on
a numerical scale that represents the preferences of the decision maker
for the various states that the attribute can assume. The function that
transforms an attribute state into a numerical representation of attribute
preference is called an attribute utility function. It is represented
by the expression u.(x.), the attribute utility function value for the
ith attribute in the attribute state xi . The proper algebraic expression
combining the attribute utility functions is called an outcome utility
function u(x), with x = (xl,...,xn) being the n-attribute outcome. An
outcome utility function is a numerical representation of the decision
maker's preferences for the outcomes. The use of the word "utility" to
represent preference or value has a rich and venerable history in econo-
mics [27-31]. It is convenient to measure attribute utility functions
on a scale from u  = 0.0 to u  = 1.0, where u  = 0.0 corresponds to the
least-preferred ith attribute state that occurs among the outcomes under
consideration, and ui = 1.0 corresponds to the most-preferred state.
An example of an attribute utility function for the attribute x 4 of
Figure 2 (grams per mile of hydrocarbon emissions) is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Typical Attribute Utility Function
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Since u4 (x4-- 0.2) - 0.5 in Figure 3, one could interpret this as
meaning that the decision maker has the same increase in preference in
decreasing hydrocarbon emissions from 0.25 grams/mile to 0.20 grams/mile
as decreasing hydrocarbon emissions from 0.20 grams/mile to 0.05 grams/
mile. Other interpretations are possible.
If all the other attributes of an outcome are held at constant states,
it is theoretically possible to construct an attribute utility function
as shown in Figure 3. There are several techniques for determining the
form of the attribute utility function. These include direct magnitude
estimation, preference difference assessments (either rank ordering of
preference differences or equal preference iaterval scaling), ratio scal-
ing, and the lottery method [12,32]. The lottery method will be used in
this Report because of its theoretical consistency, its widespread discus-
sion in the literature, and the fact that it provides a straighforward
way of handling uncertainty.
If the other attributes of an outcome are not held at constant states,
but instead are allowed to vary, then the concept of an attribute utility
function has no theoretical or practical validity unless certain indepen-
dence conditions are satisfied. The most obvious independence condition
is Lhat the form of the attribute utility function should not change if the
other attributes are held at constant, but different, attribute states.
This independence condition allows the concept of an attribute utility
function to be meaningful. The name given to this type of attribute
independence is "utility independence."
10
sIf the attributes satisfy utility independence, then it would seem
to naturally follow that the utility of the outcomes would be computed as
a weighted sum of the attribute utilities, e.g., where x - (x1 x2),
U(X) - klul(x1) + k2u2 (x2) .
Unfortunately, utility :Independence of the attributes alone does not suffice
mathematically to insure that the outcome utilities can be correctly com-
puted as the weighted sum of the attribute utilities. For the two-attribute
case, x - (xl ,x2), the correct formula, assuming utility independence, is
[5,33] :
u(x) = k1Ul (xl) + k2u2 (x2) + (1 - kl
 - k2) ul (xl) u2 (x2) .
The correct mathematical derivation shows that a multiplicative term
ul (xl) u2 (x2) with a weighting factor of (1 -k I  -k2 ) appears.
A simple example can illustrate why the weighted sum can yield
incorrect orderings of outcome preference. Consider the selection of an
aircraft with the two attributes of concern being x  = payload weight and
x2 - aircraft range. A weighted sum could incorrectly give preferential
ranking to an aircraft with a very large payload weight, but whose range
was less than the majority of the routes being considered. In the two-
attribute formula just given, assigning small values to k  and k2 results
in a formula approximately of the form:
u(x)	 u1 (x1 ) u2 (x2 ) .
11
It is in this multiplicative term that the
preferred states is correctly modeled.
W
Keeney has developed a practical algebraic expression for combining
the attribute utility functions to obtain an outcome utility function.
Rather than testing each attribute for utility independence, Keeney has
shown that it is only necessary to test one attribute for utility indepe:i-
dente (call it the reference attribute), and then to verify that the pair-
wise trade-offs of the reference attribute versus each of the other
n-1 attributes are independent of the states of the remaining n-2 attri-
butes. This pairwise trade-off independence is called "preferential
independence." These n independence conditions then lead to an algebraic
expression for the outcome utility function of the form:
n
u(x) k Q I + kkiui (xi)^ -1
where:
u(x) = the outcome utility function.
ui (xi) = the attribute utility function of the ith attribute.
k  = a scaling constant that determines the "weight" or
"importance" of the ith attribute.
k = an algebraic function of the ki I s, which scales u(x)
from u = 0.0 to u = 1.0.
For the details of the proof, the reader is referred to Keeney [34] and
Keeney and Raiffa [5].
12
The n scaling constants, ki, determine the relative importance of
t
the associated attributes. The k i 's range in value from 0.0 to 1.0, with
i
the larger values associated with the more-important attributes.
tr
When the necessary independence conditions are violated, it is
possible to divide the attribute state ranges into intervals over which
the independence conditions are approximately valid, or the set of attri-
butes can be redefined so the independence conditions are valid. It is
important to distinguish these independence conditions from the "technical
dependence" of variables which define the system model. This latter type
of dependence arises very naturally in engineering systems, and only
restricts the set of feasible systems of the system model. In the air-
craft example cited earlier in this Report; the engineering constraints
on the design of the aircraft result in a technical dependence (or func-
tional relationship) between aircraft range and payload weight. It must
be stressed that this "technical dependence" has no effect on the value
model and is not to be confused with the utility and preferential indepen-
dence conditions required of the Keeney and Raiffa formulation of the
value model.
13
The lottery method, first introduced by von Neumann and
Morgenstern [35], serves three purposes in the Keeney and Raiffa formula-
tion [5] of the multiattribute decision problem. It permits the construc-
tion of outcome or attribute utility functions, given the preferences of
the decision maker for various outcome or attribute states; it permits the
determination of the attribute scaling constants; and it permits uncer-
tainty to be treated in a straightforward manner such that utility function
values can be assigned to alternatives with uncertain outcomes.
A lottery is a gamble between a set of outcomes in which a single
outcome will result. Associated with each outcome is a probability of
the occurrence of that outcome. Lotteries are diagrammed as follows:
{ Outcome A
ttt(
	
i
{ Outcome B
Outcome C
The diagram is to be interpreted as requiring that Outcome A will occur
with probability pA, Outcome B will occur with probability p B , and
Outcome C will occur with probability p C . Only one outcome can result
(mutually exclusive) and one of the outcomes will result for certain, i.e.,
p  + p  + p  = 1.0 (collectively exhaustive). The probabilities may not
be at all easy to assess, especially if the probability of the occurrence
of an outcome is extremely small, or is based entirely on subjective
judgment with little supporting data [36]. There are also a number of
psychological biases that enter into the estimation of probabilities [37].
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Ultimately, if the value model is to represent the decision maker's
preferences, the probabilities used in the decision analysis must corres-
pond to the judgment of the decision maker.
The most common use of the lottery method is for handling uncertainty
and it is for this purpose that von Neumann and Morgenstern [35] introduced
the method. Lotteries are used to represent the uncertainty that the deci-
sion maker may have with respect to the outcomes that could result from the
selection of a specific alternative. Von Neumann and Morgenstern assumed
that lotteries and outcomes could be rank ordered in preference. They
proved that the correct numerical representation of the decision maker's
preference for a lottery is simply the expected value of the utilities
of the outcomes of the lotteries, i.e.. for a lottery that yields
Outcome A with probability p and Outcome C with probability 1-p, the correct
numerical assignment of utility to the lottery is just:
u(Lottery) - p u(A) + (1-p) u(C) .
Several other axiomatic formulations and proofs of the decision criterion
of expected utility have appeared in the literature [38-43]. Elementary
proofs are given in Hadley [44] and Luce and Raiffa [45]. See also other
i
References [46-50].
Lotteries are used in the following manner to establish outcome and
attribute utility functions. The decision maker (or his representative)
is first asked to rank order in preference three or more outcomes (or
attribute states). Let us assume that Outcome A is preferred to Outcome B,
which is in turn preferred to Outcome C. Then the decision maker is asked
15
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for a probability p such that he is indifferent between receiving Outcome B
for certain, or a lottery which yields Outcome A with probability p and
Outcome C with probability 1-p. In terms of the following diagram, the
decision maker is asked to assign a probability p to the following lottery
such that he is indifferent between receiving (a) or (b):
{ Outcome A^
P	 t
(b)
1-p
1 
Outcome C
(a) {Outcome B) or
If one arbitrarily assigns a utility of u(A) - 1.0 and u(C) = 0.0 (this is
not absolutely necessary, but simplifes the arithmetic). The utility of
Outcome B will just be u(b) = p. When the utility function of the ith
attribute is being assessed, the most-preferred attribute state is
arbitrarily assigned a utility of u i = 1.0 and the least-preferred state is
assigned a utility of ui = 0.0. Then the attribute utility function is
determined by the same lottery technique as used for the outcomes. If xi
is defined to be the most-preferred state of the ith attribute, and xi is
defined to be the least-preferred state, then the decision maker is asked
to assign a probability pi to the following lottery such that he is
indifferent between receiving (a) or (b):
p
<1,-pv
Attribute xi
(a) 
I 
Attribute x i ^	 or	 (b)
{ Attribute xi
16
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in the attribute utility function of Figure 3 in Section 5, pi would equal
0.5 for xi M 0.20 grams/mile, i.e., ui(xi • 0.20 grams/mile) - 0.5.
The attribute scaling constants, ki, are assessed in a similar manner
using the lottery method. The scaling constant k  measures the importance
of the ith attribute, or the degree to which the ith attribute can influence
the decision maker's preferences between the outcomes. Several artificial
outcomes are constructed (they may not be technically feasible, but it is
still possible to assign a preference to them in principle). The first
outcome is constructed by placing all of the attributes at their most-
preferred states (define this outcome to be x*). The second outcome is
constructed by placing all of the attributes at their least-preferred states
(define this outcome to be xo). Then construct an outcome in which all of
the attributes are placed at their least-preferred states except the
ith attribute, which is placed at its most-preferred state. Then the deci-
sion maker is asked to assign a probability k  such that he is indifferent
between (a) and (b);
most-preferred
states
Attribute	 State	 k	 x*
xi	 most-preferred
	
(a) x3 0 xi least-preferred	 or (b)	 least-preferred
states
1-ki
	x° }
The probability k  is the attribute scaling constant for the ith attribute.
This procedure is discussed in detail in Keeney and Raiffa [5].
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unique outcome. Instead it specifies a lottery over a set of outcomes.
Since the decision maker cannot have the most-preferred outcome for
certain, the best that can be done is to select the alternative that
results in the most-preferred lottery. Thus, a decision alternative
can be assigned a utility, namely the expected utility of its corres-
ponding lottery, and the most-preferred alternative is that for which
the utility is maximized.
As a final example for this Report, consider the case of the chief
executive officer of an electric utility company who must decide on the
next unit of expansion for baseload electrical capacity. Let us suppose
that after much engineering, environmental, and regulatory analysis that
the decision alternatives are either (a) a coal-fired plant with stack
scrubbers or (b) a solar central power tower. Where an initial capital
investment is concerned, the alternative (a) of a coal-fired plant in-
volves no uncertainty. The decision alternative and the outcome are one
and the same. However, with the alternative (b) of a solar central power
tower, the R&D program in progress could significantly influence the cost-
competitiveness of the solar central power tower. Thus, if the chief
executive officer has to make the decision prior the completion of the
R&D program, he is faced with a decision to choose between alternative (a)
which yields an outcome for certain, and alternative (b) which is a
lottery over the outcomes of the R&D program. The decision inalysis
18
diagram would be:
F.
1 Solar power tower 1
	
p	 1 RAD successful f
(a) {Coal-fired plant
	 or (b)
	
1-p	 UO
olar power tower
 not successful)
The decision would be made based on a value model that includes as
objectives such factors as annualized cost, environmental effects, coal
availability, and the probability p that the R&D program would be
successful.
19
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7 .	 Summary
Multiattribute decision analysis is a technique for aiding the
decision maker in comparing and selecting between complex alternatives.
The complexity may arise for several reasons: (1) the system model may
be inherently complex, (2) the value model of the decision maker may con-
tain many objectives, and trade-offs need to be made between these objec-
tives, and (3) uncertainties may exist that prevent the selection of a
specific alternative from uniquely determining the outcome. Multiattri-
bute decision analysis has the analytical capability to handle all of
these complexities with a practical and theoretically consistent approach.
20
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